By constructing a dynamic game model of enterprise entry and a complete information dynamic game model of tax rate and enterprise's output, this paper deduces the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium among government and enterprise after collecting the envir
By constructing a dynamic game model of enterprise entry and a complete information dynamic game model of tax rate and enterprise's output, this paper deduces the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium among government and enterprise after collecting the envir
通过构建企业进入博弈模型和政府税率与企业产量博弈的完全信息动态博弈模型，导出政府、企业双方局中人在开征环境污染税后所达到的子博弈完美纳什均衡，可分析我国开征环境污染税的可行性以及所能达到的效果，从而为环境污染税的开征提供理论依据。